

What causes democratic revolutions?

	Question asked / Theory proposed	Case study / Evidence	Rejected alternative explanations
Przeworski	<p><u>Why do some countries end authoritarian regimes successfully?</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Negotiation between hardliners, moderates, reformers, and radicals on both sides (pro-regime, opposition) Negotiated settlement between moderate coalitions on both sides most likely to lead to democracy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (range of cases considered) Game theory analysis of incentives for each bloc 	
McFaul	<p><u>Why do some countries democratize successfully?</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Balance of power between democrats and dictators Even power --> unstable regime conflating factors (border disputes, Western influence) explain variations from theory 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Postcommunist transitions: many failed or unstable democracies resulted --> challenges alternative explanations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Negotiated transitions theory: Even power --> negotiations --> fair institutions and even distribution of spoils --> stable democracies
Kopstein	<p><u>What proximate factors help explain democratization?</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Communism flattens status hierarchies in E. Europe to make democratization more likely in 1989 EU conditionality incentivizes democratization in early 2000s lack of both factors now suggests greater likelihood of authoritarian populism in nondemocracies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Revolutions of 1989 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consider history and proximate causes often overlooked by transition theories (e.g. Przeworski, McFaul)
Kuran	<p><u>Why sudden revolutions?</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Preference falsification --> understate regime support Event triggers reevaluation of (interdependent) citizen preferences --> sudden opposition 	<p><u>Eastern European revolutions of 1989</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regimes more fragile than thought Opposition more widespread than thought Individual psychology and experience of citizens 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Structuralism: class and economic conditions (e.g. distribution of power, deprivation); but fails to predict actual (rather than potential) revolution Rational choice: too individualistic
Weyland	<p><u>Why does protest diffuse across countries?</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Domestic economic decline + popular discontent sets stage Norm diffusion of liberalism creates precondition for revolution Cognitive shortcuts: highly visible revolutions --> rational learning of likelihood of protest success --> trigger wave of revolutions 	<p><u>Revolutions of 1848</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> primitive communications networks revolutionary waves inspired (mistakenly) by French case 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> "Norm cascade"--revolutionaries espoused different goals and values in different countries
Way	<p><u>Why authoritarian stability?</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> If less linkage with West (fewer outside efforts at regime change) If stronger autocratic party/state (greater immunity to dissent) If greater state control over wealth (more resources to prevent or weaken dissent) 	<p><u>'Color revolutions' (2000s: Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weak state organization Revolutions more likely in economic liberalization or less natural resource monopoly wealth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diffusion theory: opposition combines elections and protests strategy to topple regime, following other successes in other countries
Bunce/Wochik	<p><u>Why do revolutions arise?</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Electoral model of protest is key: maximize chance of pro-democracy opposition's electoral victory Diffusion of the approach across countries --> waves of revolution Regime weakness partly a matter of perception 	<p>(Color revolutions)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rejoinder to Way: structural features of regime alone cannot explain variation in pattern of revolution incidence and
Beissinger	<p><u>Why are revolutions in different countries so similar?</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Focus on social bases of mobilization: tools and strategies shared across countries --> wave 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rejoinder to Way: Authoritarian weakness alone cannot account for incidence of revolution, and similarities in revolutionary events despite varied national contexts